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In labor-management relations justice delayed
is often justice denied. A remedy granted more
than two years after the event will bear little relation
to the human situation which gave rise to the need
for Government intervention.ttt
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man's buff." See WEBsR's INTERNATIoisTAL DIcrONiARY 234 (3d ed. P. Gove ed.
1966).
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* Caveat au Douglas
In June 1965, Mr. Justice Douglas commented on the problem of non-disclosure
of special pleader status among those who contribute to law reviews. He deplored
the failure of the reviews to disclose in the first footnote that "the views presented
are those of special pleaders who fail to disclose that they are not scholars but
rather people with axes to grind. The reader should know through what spectacles
his adviser is viewing the problem." Douglas, Law Reviews and Fiull Disclosure,
40 WASH. L. Rv. 227, 228-30 (1965). At the same time, he spoke of labor arbi-
trators as follows:
There was a time when the line between "management" and "labor" was
clear-cut. But we now have a professional class in between these groups.
They are the arbiters who sit on ever-widening issues and render a unique
public service. Those arbiters are the experts in the field, and their advice
and wisdom are sorely needed. . . . They have retired to the sidelines, as
judges do, leaving the contest to others. Their withdrawal robs the current
debate of perspective and wisdom. That however, is another aspect of the
problem which I pass by. I propose here only that when a special pleader
enters the list he show his colors.
Id. at 232. But see Hays, The Future of Labor Arbitration, 74 YALE L.J. 1019,
1034 (1965) : "Too much of the material which is now available consists of enthusi-
astic endorsement of arbitration by arbitrators who are making a living from it. . ..
I share both of Mr. Justice Douglas' convictions. As to the first, law review
writers certainly should always be identifiable lii terms permitting informed evalu-
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I
"Discovery" in Anglo-American law is a congeries of remedies
used to elicit facts in litigation.1 It has evolved to respond to NOW-
problems; delay is its nemesis. Discovery is typically invoked before
trial, but is available during its course. It permits prompt access to
data or documents in the control of adversaries or other persons. Dis-
covery discloses not only the identity of persons who may appear as
witnesses, but also the substance of their contemplated testimony; it
makes available documents and other evidence which may be submitted
or which are relevant to the dispute. Thus, discovery produces in-
formation for use in the investigation and evaluation of the relative
strengths and weaknesses in the positions of the disputants. This ex-
posure often results in pre-trial settlements.
ation of their scholarship. But I would also hope that their readers remain objective
in measuring their performance, neither uncritically absorbing their reasoning nor
hypercritically rejecting it without analysis. Judge Hays appears to view arbi-
trators as Galileans from whom no good can be expected because, as is commonly
known, they normally are compensated by the parties for their time and judgment.
As a sometime labor arbitrator and a full-time law professor (a blend of academe
and the real world quite common among labor arbitrators), however, there is little
doubt in my own mind that my career would look about the same had labor arbi-
tration evolved on a no-fee basis. I would still have wanted to do substantially the same
amount of arbitrating, would still have reacted in much the same way to the various
problems I have encountered and still would have been seeking to analyze thoroughly
their implications in much the same manner as I have in law review articles. Indeed,
for all I know, I might also have been a good deal more casual about the impact of
my decisions as an arbitrator had I not been all too aware that the parties to collec-
tive agreements were compensating me for whatever I might do for them (or to
them). In my observation, arbitrators are keenly aware that they are economically
beholden to both parties and, therefore, decisionally, to neither.
Ironically, it is a fact of arbitral life that, professor or not, he who both arbi-
trates and writes for legal periodicals surrenders a certain measure of acceptability
with each analytical paragraph. Contrary to Judge Hays, the truly venal arbitrator,
if he exists, is to be found neither in the BNA or CCH case reports, nor in the
law journals. He publishes absolutely nothing but his name, rank and telephone
number.
This leads me to Mr. Justice Douglas' second observation. I am not nearly so
convinced that arbitrators have actually "retired to the sidelines" as I am that they
should not do so. We have little enough comprehension of the adjudicative function.
Experienced arbitrators, who may speak without the constraints of the judiciary,
can help us understand the mind of the decision maker if they will speak with candor
within the bounds of the propriety necessary to protect the parties. In my view,
they also thereby may help to shape the dynamic evolution of new and promising
uses for this ancient tribunal idea.
This is the first of three articles. The second will be The Accretion of Federal
Power in Labor Arbitration--The Example of Arbitral Discovery, to appear in the
March issue of this Review. The third, The Labor Board, the Courts and Arbitration
-A Feasibility Study of Tribunal Interaction in Grievable Refusals to Disclose, is
scheduled for the April issue of the Review.
lit UNITED STATES ADVIsORY PANEL ON LABOR-MANAGEM1ENT RELATIONS LAW,
S. Doc. No. 81, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Cox PANEL].
'See Millar, The Mechanism Of Fact-Discovery: A Study In Comparative Civil
Procedure, 32 ILL. L. REV. 261, 262 (1937).
Professor David W. Louisell of the University of California at Berkeley has
written extensively and helpfully of discovery. See LoursEL., MODERN CALIFORNIA
DxscovERY (1963) [hereinafter cited as LomsELL] ; Louisell, Discovery and Pre-Trial
Under the Minnesota Rules, 36 MINN. L. REv. 633 (1952). In preparing this series
of articles I have relied heavily on Professor Charles Alan Wrights excellent HAN-
DOOH OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL CouRTs (1963).
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There is a significant difference between the expectations of those
who have voluntarily committed themselves to the arbitration of their
future disputes and those who find themselves embroiled in litigation.
Historically, an atmosphere of openhanded disclosure has existed
among those who have resorted to arbitration. This atmosphere re-
flects an expectation that all of the facts of the dispute will be brought
into the hearing so that, in the words of a 1596 English decree, a
"'friendly and quyett end'" to the matter may be had from "'some
indifferent gentlemen who are of understanding and dwell in the country
where the controversy groweth and may thereby knowe the partyes and
credytt of the wytnesses.' " 2
On the other hand, the antagonistic nature of the adversary
process was hardly conducive to full disclosure. Ultimately, a growing
professional and judicial intolerance toward calculated or unwitting
concealment of decisionally significant facts in judicial proceedings gave
rise to mounting pressures for more effective discovery. These pres-
sures have been met with favorable responses.
For years it has been commonplace to observe that discovery pro-
cedures have no place in arbitration.' Oddly, the assertion has gone
unchallenged, even unstudied, although there is little judicial or
scholarly authority to support it. Apparently, this repeatedly asserted,
but largely unexplained, predilection against arbitral discovery arose
in earlier years as a reaction to the functioning of commercial arbitra-
tion. This appears to be another instance in which a pattern of reason-
ing appropriate to one area of experience is improperly imposed upon
another area. In reality there are a number of situations-referred to
here as "discovery situations"--currently encountered by labor arbi-
trators, in which one of the parties to a collective bargaining agreement
very much needs and wants some form of discovery, preferably in the
context of arbitration. It appears that accumulating experience now
challenges and eventually will overcome the old antipathy to arbitral
discovery.
Concern here is with those disclosure disputes occurring during
the term of collective bargaining agreements which contain provisions
for arbitration. The major question is whether judicially developed
discovery procedures are legally and prudently adaptable to labor arbi-
tration and, if so, how and by whom? Response to this question re-
quires identification and analysis of a host of fact and policy con-
siderations. The solution to the principal inquiry, however, is of
considerably less public significance than is an examination of the
2 J. DAwsoN, A HIsToRY oF LAY J uMEs 168 (1960).
3 See, e.g., Louxs=u at 17; Developments it the Law-Discovery, 74 Hv. L.
REv. 940, 943 (1961).
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several areas of policy which must be accommodated in order to reach
a sound conclusion as to the utility, if any, of legal discovery pro-
cedures in labor arbitration. This process of accommodation will be
characteristic of any effort to draw on the accepted uses of law in
response to the evolving needs of labor arbitration.
The principal questions to be drawn into focus are:
A. How much practical need is there for arbitral discovery?
Would such discovery have utility for both employers and
unions in solving real NOW-problems? What options
might it afford them? To what extent is labor arbitration
a competent mechanism for the administration of dis-
covery procedures?
B. Do the respective evolutions of judicial discovery and of
labor arbitration tend to affirm or to deny the viability
of arbitral discovery? If utilization of discovery as an
arbitral remedy is found desirable, how would it be related
to relevant federal and state doctrines? How might
interaction among courts, administrative agencies and
labor arbitration best be arranged to permit an effective
yet fair response to discovery situations?
C. To what extent is the National Labor Relations Board
confronted with contractual refusals to disclose? Relative
to the possible alternative utilization of courts or labor
arbitrators, how effective is the Labor Board in discovery
situations? How can the Board respond more effectively
to disclosure cases during the terms of collective bargain-
ing agreements?
Essentially, this will be a study of tribunal interaction. Our
inquiry will involve the weaving together of a welter of existing bar-
gaining realities and legal doctrines in order to fashion an appropriate
remedy. It may be useful to state some conclusions at the outset.
There are occasions during the terms of collective agreements when a
party is seriously disadvantaged and the bargaining relationship sig-
nificantly impaired by a contractually unwarranted refusal of the other
party to disclose, upon request; needed bargaining information. The
possible avenues of recourse for the disadvantaged party are a Labor
Board proceeding or arbitration. But the Board's disclosure pro-
cedures are so archaic that the disclosure ultimately achieved through
its intervention in no sense can be equated with "discovery." The
Board's disability in this respect is structural, not doctrinal. It pri-
marily involves its relationship to judicial review, the inexorable time-
span hampering its disposal of the problem and its lack of proximity to
the disputants-physically, psychologically and legally. Board in-
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effectiveness means that the only viable remedy for a contractually
wrongful refusal to disclose is to be found in arbitration.
The courts still must provide protection against the possibility of
harassment or maladministration of arbitral discovery. Such pro-
tection is available in the federal district courts or equivalent state
courts on an expedited basis under section 301 of the Taft-Hartley
Act.4 The Labor Board, of course, must retain its jurisdiction to
respond to statutory abuses of the grievance procedure.' But the
presence of disclosure problems should require first-instance resort to
arbitration for discovery. Arbitral discovery should be backstopped
only by expedited judicially imposed protective orders and, later, if
appropriate, by the Board's condemnation of unfair labor practices,
enforced by the courts of appeals.
A number of questions of desirability must be resolved before it
may be concluded that arbitral discovery is an appropriate remedy
enforceable under section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act. Since courts
lack sufficient experience with collective bargaining to function in
place of labor arbitrators, and since the Labor Board is empowered to
act exclusively of both arbitrators and courts in the first instance, why
not simply assign the NOW-problems of refusals to disclose to the
Board? Is there really a demonstrable need for an arbitral discovery
remedy? Does "the law" preclude arbitral discovery? Would arbitral
discovery result in the addition to the grievance procedure of unneeded
(and unwanted) formalism, legalism or complexity? Would it need-
lessly add burdensome expense to arbitration, because of the intro-
duction of technicalities requiring lawyers as advocates? Would non-
lawyer arbitrators be able to administer discovery prudently and effec-
tively? Would the availability of discovery unduly stimulate an
adversary atmosphere? Would it introduce significant delays in getting
the substance of the dispute resolved? Would discovery operate as a
remedy stacked against either employers or unions? Would the
availability of discovery lure one or the other party to embark upon
"fishing expeditions"? Would discovery result in attempts to blackmail
settlements or to harass, oppress or embarrass? Would it be used
as a dilatory- tactic or used to permit perjured testimony at the subse-
quent hearing? How would it be possible to obtain arbitral discovery
relief in advance of arbitration? Would the testimonial privileges of
witnesses be jeopardized by allowance of arbitral discovery? Is arbitral
discovery too broad a remedy for run-of-the-mill grievances? Would
4 Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1964) [hereinafter cited as
LMRA § 301].
5 National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1964) [hereinafter cited as
NLRA].
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it be possible to have adequate protection against abuses of discovery
without exorbitant cost? If discovery is desirable in labor arbitration,
should it be administered by the courts, who are experienced with
discovery, rather than by arbitrators?
The legal context in which these questions must be answered is
federal.' Some state legislatures have recognized that discovery can
be useful in arbitration.' But, in such states, the question of whether
depositions are available in labor arbitration has been converted into a
federal question in which federal policy preempts state law. A series
of Supreme Court cases point the way to the conclusion that discovery
depositions are now available in these states for use in federally regu-
lated collective bargaining situations and describe the sequence of
tribunal interaction in which discovery should be made available in
labor arbitration.
In Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills,8 the court concluded
that "the substantive law to apply in suits under 301(a) [of the
Labor-Management Relations Act, which governs the enforcement of
arbitration agreements] is federal law, which the courts must fashion
from the policy of our national labor laws." ' The Act, the Court
observed, "expressly furnishes some substantive law." "o But the
Court recognized that some problems could not be solved by resort
to express statutory provisions. Such problems are to be solved "by
6Whether an arbitral remedy will be recognized, of course, should be resolved
primarily in relation to the nature and needs of collective bargaining. In 1955 the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, addressing them-
selves to arbitration generally in the context of commentary on their proposed Uni-
form Arbitration Act, were emphatic in rejecting arbitral discovery: "It would be
most unwise and inappropriate in an arbitration proceeding to permit the taking of
depositions, not to obtain testimony of someone outside the state, but for discovery
purposes of the party." NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM
STATE LAWS, 1955 UNIFORM ARBrIRATION ACT PROCEEDINGS 31.
But why? Surely in the course of arbitrating various types of issues there arise
circumstances in which discovery can be the difference between justice assured and
justice denied. Dogmatic exclusion of arbitral discovery in all circumstances is incom-
patible with the pragmatic flexibility of arbitration. "Perhaps the solution lies in
approaching the problem not from the viewpoint of arbitration generally, but according
to the type of issues involved. . . ." LouisELL 20.
If it be argued that discovery is too expensive or time consuming to have utility
in arbitration, the argument more properly might be addressed initially to an arbitrator
or thereafter to a superintending court in the specifics of an alleged abuse in a par-
ticular case in which one party seeks to avail himself of the procedure. The power
exists to avoid abuses. As we shall see, aside from isolated instances, expense and
time consumption are rarely experienced hazards.
7For example, in 1963, California amended its arbitration statute to make dis-
covery generally available in uninsured motorist arbitration. At the same session
of the legislature, however, a bill was submitted which would have made resort to
depositions available in the broadest terms to parties to arbitrations, whether for
use as evidence or for discovery purposes. The bill (SB 683) was never reported
out of committee. See CAL. INS. CODE § 11580.2(e) (West Supp. 1966) ; LouisELL 20.
8 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
9Id. at 456.
10 Id. at 457.
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looking at the policy of the legislation and fashioning a remedy that
will effectuate that policy." 11 The Court was expansive in its man-
date: "The range of judicial inventiveness will be determined by the
nature of the problem." 2 The states were expressly preempted:
Federal interpretation of the federal law will govern, not state
law. . . . But state law, if compatible with the purpose of
§ 301, may be resorted to in order to find the rule that will
best effectuate the federal policy. . . . Any state law applied,
however, will be absorbed as federal law and will not be an
independent source of private rights.'"
In USW v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co.'4 and USW v.
Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp.,5 the Court committed responsibility
for the initial formulation of remedies to arbitrators. The Court
reasoned that this is a sound allocation of power because a "labor
arbitrator performs functions which are not normal to the courts; the
considerations which help him fashion judgments may indeed be
foreign to the competence of courts." " "The labor arbitrator's source
of law is not confined to the express provisions of the contract .. ,, 17
The latter idea was reiterated by the Court in John Wiley &
Sons, Inc. v. Livingston.'" The "collective agreement is not an ordi-
nary contract. . . . Central to the peculiar status and function of
a collective bargaining agreement is the fact . . . that it is not in
any real sense the simple product of a consensual relationship." 19
Therefore the Court commissioned arbitrators to operate "within the
flexible procedures of arbitration" to fashion solutions "which would
avoid disturbing labor relations .... ," 20 These solutions are not
limited to substantive interpretations.
Once it is determined . . . that the parties are obligated to
submit the subject matter of a dispute to arbitration, "pro-
cedural" questions which grow out of the dispute and bear
on its final disposition should be left to the arbitrator."
11 Id.
12Id.
13 Id.
14 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
'5 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
16 USW v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581 (1960).
17Id.
18 376 U.S. 543 (1964)
19 Id. at 550.
2 0 Id. at 551 n.5.
21 id. at 557.
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The procedural questions contemplated by the Court in Wiley
are those problems related to the internal operation of the labor
arbitral process. They do not involve procedural issues extrinsic to
the process. For instance, timeliness of a suit to enforce an agreement
to arbitrate, determinable only by looking outside the terms of the
collective agreement-to "law," in other words-is a procedural issue
allocable by UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp.' to resolution by courts
applying state statutes. But timeliness of a grievance seeking to
enforce an obligation contained in the agreement, assertedly violated
by one of the parties to it, is intrinsic. It is determined only by looking
to the terms of this single agreement. The answer is to be found in
the internal law created by and governing these collective bargainers,
not in the external law governing all bargains. It is a procedural issue
reserved by Wiley for decision by arbitrators.
How discovery procedures shall be administered within an exist-
ing bargaining relationship is a delicate question which recently con-
fronted the Supreme Court in NLRB v. Acme Industrial Co.0 3 The
Court set the principle of discovery in the collective bargaining environ-
ment as somehow coexistent with grievance procedures terminating in
arbitration. The Court has not yet told us how this will work, un-
doubtedly because it is too early for the Court to know. But discovery
is a right idea, even though it radiates ripples of complexity touching
many important concepts and realities of our national labor policy.
We turn now to a consideration of Acme Industrial, since it serves
as a useful introduction to the nature of discovery situations and to
the problems of tribunal interaction in dealing with these situations.
II
In 1967, in NLRB v. Acme Industrial Co.,24 the Supreme Court
examined discovery in the context of collective bargaining during the
term of an agreement containing an arbitration provision. The case
presented a classic NOW-problem. In January 1964, the Union dis-
covered that certain machinery was being removed from the company's
plant. When union representatives asked about the removal, the
company's foremen replied that since there had been no violation of
the collective agreement, the company was not contractually obliged
to answer the questions. Eleven grievances were filed promptly.
The agreement provided that "[i]t is the Company's general
policy not to subcontract work which is normally performed by em-
22 383 U.S. 696, 704-05 (1966).
23 385 U.S. 432 (1967).
2 4 Id.
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ployees in the bargaining unit where this will cause the layoff of
employees or prevent the recall of employees who would normally
perform this work. ,, 25 The agreement also contained the
commitment of the employer that
[i]n the event the equipment of the plant . . . is hereafter
moved to another location of the Company, employees work-
ing in the plant . . .who are subject to reduction in classi-
fication or layoff as a result thereof may transfer to the new
location with full rights and seniority, unless there is then in
existence at the new location a collective bargaining agree-
ment covering . . . employees at such location. 6
When the Company did not respond satisfactorily to the eleven
grievances, the Union's president wrote the company president re-
questing
"the following information at the earliest possible date:
"1. The approximate dates when each piece of equipment
was moved out of the plant.
"2. The place to which each piece of equipment was
moved and whether such place is a facility which is
operated or controlled by the Company.
"3. The number of machines or equipment that was
moved out of the plant.
"4. What was the reason or purpose of moving the
equipment out of the plant.
"5. Is this equipment used for production elsewhere." 2
The company replied that it had no duty to furnish this information,
since neither layoffs nor reductions in job classifications had occurred
within the five-day period established by the agreement for the filing
of grievances.
At that point, the union's only realistic options to vindicate its
rights as it conceived them were: one, to press one or all of the eleven
grievances to arbitration, with a section 301 s court order if necessary;
immediately upon selection of the arbitrator to request an order from
him compelling disclosure of the information; simultaneously to file a
section 8(a) (5) 29 charge with the NLRB, thereby assuring that the
matter would not be barred by the statutory limitation of six months; 30
251d. at 433.
16 Id. at 433-34.
27 Id. at 434.
2sLMRA §301, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1964).
2 LMRA § 8(a) (5), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (5) (1964).
so LMRA § 10(b), 29 U.S.C. § 160(b).
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two, simply to file charges with the Board or seek arbitration ex-
clusively. In either case, immediate judicial relief would be unavailable
(assuming that the company resisted) because a court would be
compelled by existing doctrines to withhold its own remedies and
either order arbitration under the agreement or defer to the Board's
jurisdiction under the statute.
The union elected to file a section 8(a) (5) charge on May 7, 1964.
By not seeking arbitration for what was quite evidently a NOW-
problem, the union inexorably committed itself to an extended timespan
in its quest for discovery. A Trial Examiner heard the matter on
August 24, 1964, and issued his Intermediate Report on October 7,
recommending that the complaint be dismissed on the ground that the
parties had established a contractual procedure for the resolution of
this kind of dispute. Prompt acceptance of his recommendation prob-
ably would have resulted in arbitral discovery six months after the
filing of the charge. On February 1, 1965, however, the Board re-
jected his recommendation. It found a violation and ordered the
Company to "[f ] urnish, upon request . . .information concerning the
removal of equipment and machinery from its plant." 31
By the time of the Board decision, the long delay had converted
the problem from a question of discovery to a matter of vindication of
a statutory right. The controversy then moved to the Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit which, on October 6, 1965, concluding
that the Trial Examiner had been right in the first place, refused to
enforce the Board's disclosure order. 2
Thus, after two years, the union was told that it should have
resolved its grievance through the contractual procedure. Normally,
that would have been that; but the Supreme Court granted certiorari,
adding another phase to the timespan of this discovery situation.
On January 9, 1967, three years from the time when the concern of
the union had first been aroused by the removal of the machinery, the
Court reversed the Seventh Circuit: "We hold that the Board's order
in this case was consistent both with the express terms of the Labor
Act and with the national labor policy favoring arbitration which our
decisions have discerned as underlying that law." 33
The Court also stated that there "can be no question of the general
obligation of an employer to provide information that is needed by the
bargaining representative for the proper performance of its duties." "
There was no doubt that "the duty to bargain unquestionably extends
31150 N.L.R.B. 1463, 1466-67 (1965).
2 Acme Industrial Co. v. NLRB, 351 F.2d 258 (7th Cir. 1965).
3 385 U.S. at 439.
841d. at 435-36.
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beyond the period of contract negotiations," into the period of the
administration of the collective agreement. 5
The Court placed great emphasis on the fact that the Board's order
to disclose did not result in its "making a binding construction of the
labor contract." " The Board had acted only on the assumption that
the information requested was probably relevant and useful to the
union in carrying out its statutory responsibilities. "This discovery-
type standard," said the Court, "decided nothing about the merits of
the union's contractual claims." 3T This was simply a "threshold deter-
mination" by the Board which "in no way threatens the power which
the parties have given the arbitrator to make binding interpretations
of the labor agreement." ' Indeed, "[f]ar from intruding upon the
preserve of the arbitrator, the Board's action was in aid of the arbitral
process." " It prevented the arbitral process from being overloaded
with unmeritorious, unwinnowed grievances. The union, it felt, was
entitled to evaluate the merits of its grievance first, rather than incur-
ring the expense of arbitration "only . . . to learn that the machines
had been relegated to the junk heap. Nothing in federal labor law
requires such a result." o
The Court's observations, unfortunately, carry potential for con-
siderable dislocation in that highly sensitive sector of the collective
bargaining process in which the remedy of discovery is sought. It is
certainly true that the grievance procedure must winnow out the vast
majority of grievances prior to the final step of arbitration. By no
means is it true, however, that for this purpose, reliance should be
placed on the Labor Board, rather than on arbitration. Particularly
dangerous to the sound evolution of a workable pattern of Board-
courts-arbitration interaction is the Court's division of function in
Acme Industrial between a "threshold determination," thought not to
require arbitration, and the resolution of the substantive issues which
would presumably be posed by discovery. Yet "[i]n the context of
the plant or industry," the Court had more perceptively observed at an
earlier date, "the grievance may assume proportions of which judges
are ignorant." '
It takes no great prescience to imagine a court citing Acme
Industrial, as it justifies its decision to administer discovery in a
grievance dispute, instead of sending the parties to arbitration. After
35 Id. at 436.
36 Id. at 437.
37 Id.
38Id. at 438.
39 Id.
4o Id. at 438-39.
41 USW v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 567 (1960).
19681
582 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
all, the reasoning would speciously go, it would thereby only be making
a "threshold determination concerning the potential relevance of the
requested information" 4 just like the Labor Board in Acme Industrial.
This is reminiscent of the repudiated "arbitrability" analysis of
Machinists v. Cutler-Hammer, Igc.,43 whereby courts would take hold
of the merits under the guise of determining whether the contract
provided for their resolution in arbitration."
There are few collective bargaining situations more sensitive and
more demanding of whatever insights arbitrators may have acquired
than the typical discovery situation. Discovery raises critical issues
for each party. "Intrusion" is the spectre-intrusion either into the
heartland of managerial discretion or into internal union affairs. If
any "threshold" action of a procedural nature could be said to fit
properly into the procedural competence of the arbitrator, as defined by
the Court's rationale in Wiley, this is it. "Threshold determination"
it may be. But its capacity to trip up the unwary or the inexperienced
is great indeed, and a mistake here may frustrate whatever may occur
thereafter in any arbitration on the merits.
It was curiously unworldly of the Court to observe that to oust
the Board
would force the union to take a grievance all the way through
to arbitration without providing the opportunity to evaluate
the merits of the claim. The expense of arbitration might be
placed upon the union only for it to learn that the machines
had been relegated to the junk heap. Nothing in federal
labor law requires such a result.
45
In the normal course of an NLRB refusal-to-disclose proceeding, as
the record before the Court in Acme Industrial emphatically evidenced,
the union already has been forced to take its grievance "all the way
through" about three years of procrastination, often being required to
resort both to the Board and to a reviewing circuit court of appeals in
order to gain access to the information affecting its claim. One has
to be naive indeed to conclude that those three years do not constitute
an expense far greater than the cost of taking a grievance all the way
through to arbitration. The merits of the grievance, in the abstract,
might lie with the union, but, in the concrete, are enjoyed by the
employer for at least those three years. This is very visibly evident
to his employees, the union's potentially disgruntled constituency.
42385 U.S. at 438.
43 271 App. Div. 917, 67 N.Y.S.2d 317, aff'd, 297 N.Y. 519, 74 N.E.2d 464 (1947).
44 The Supreme Court in 1960 denounced Cutler-Hammer as embodying "a prin-
ciple that could only have a crippling effect on grievance arbitration." tTSW v.
American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 566-67 (1960).
4 5 NLRB v. Acme Industrial Co., 385 U.S. 432, 438 (1967).
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With what remedy can the Labor Board confront the kind of
bargaining fiasco posited by the Court? As the record before the
Court certainly made explicit, the Board, well over a year after the
refusal, will issue an order which then takes another year or more
to be enforced by a court, which sternly will direct the employer "on
request of the union" to disclose the information which the union had
sought futilely two or three years earlier. But after all, what has the
employer lost by his unlawful refusal? Nothing. On the contrary, he
has gained considerably, having enjoyed almost a three-year mora-
torium on the merits. He also has achieved a marked psychological
advantage in the constant competition between the union and the
employer for the loyalty of the employees. The prize is directly trans-
latable into immediate bargaining power. This gain is thus the
measure of the union's loss.
In contrast, the arbitrator has the legal power to make that kind
of calculated nondisclosure quite costly for a recalcitrant employer or,
for that matter, for an unresponsive union. As to the employer, the
arbitrator, of course, can require payment of back pay to all employees
who have suffered loss of compensation. And he also can fix the
operative date as that upon which the union or an affected employee
would have filed a grievance, but for the employer's wrongful refusal
to disclose. He can cause reversal of the employer's actions in non-
wage cases (for example, plant removal or subcontracting) to be
effective on the date that disclosure properly was requested and wrong-
fully was withheld. The prospect of that remedial power is itself quite
likely to result in counsel's disclosure advice being taken seriously by
a stubborn employer. Board strictures, however, are of little financial
concern to the same employer.
Thus, if Justice Stewart's hypothetical junk heap promptly had
been taken into arbitration to remedy the refusal to disclose, and it
then had turned out to be a rusting fact, the arbitrator, the agreement
permitting (as it often would), would quite likely have assessed the
employer for the entire costs of the proceeding (a remedy beyond
the Board or the typical American court); most certainly he would
have included any consequent wages lost during the period of time
that the employer was so coy with his junk heap (a measure of dam-
ages impossible before the Board and unlikely in a court).
In contrast to the courts, the Labor Board has acquired that type
of "institutional competency" 46 which enables it to be sensitive to
46The Court observed in Acime Iizdstrial that the Steelworkers trilogy-nAmer-
ican Mfg. Co., Warrior & Gulf, and Enterprise Wheel & Car-
dealt with the relationship of courts to arbitrators when an arbitration
award is under review or when the employer's agreement to arbitrate is in
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these delicate issues. But the Board's expertise never is exercised in
isolation. Its "institutional competency" is diluted, since it always
must interact with the several circuits of the federal court of appeals.
The judges actually co-author almost half of the Board's orders. Some
43 per cent of its 951 cases in fiscal 1965 resulted in some kind of
judicial reaction. 47  The federal judges do not act pro forma, function-
ing submissively as silent partners of the Board. In 1965, the courts
either modified or set aside the Board's orders in 42.5 per cent of
the cases.8 This substantial sharing of institutional responsibility, with
the courts functioning as the dominant last-word partner, considerably
diminishes the "institutional competency" of the Board, to the degree
that the courts displace that tribunal's specialized occupational sensi-
tivity to problems which simply are not perceptible to the courts.
Thus, the Court's equation of arbitrators and the Labor Board
can be seriously misleading, unless this limitation on the expertise of
the Board is recognized. It is not completely true that the "relation-
ship of the Board to the arbitration process is of a quite different
order" ' from that of the courts to arbitrators. Thus the courts act
as the Board's intellectual Siamese twin, by no means of like mind,
often wrongheadedly tugging against the pull of their brother, to the
detriment of the common purposes of stability and fairness.
A second problem with the Court's approach is that, however it
may be categorized, the Board's action in response to discovery situa-
tions cannot possibly be said to be "relief." This is so, because "in
the labor field, as in few others, time is crucially important in obtaining
relief." 11 And of all of the bargaining situations in which the factor
of time is paramount, disclosure problems are in the first rank.
Thus, it cannot be said that the Board or the courts have the
requisite "institutional competency" to administer collective bargaining
discovery. The arbitrator somehow must be fitted into a distinct role
question. The weighing of the arbitrator's greater institutional competency,
which was so vital to those decisions, must be evaluated in that context.
• . . The relationship of the Board to the arbitration process is of a quite
different order.
385 U.S. at 436.
4730 NLRB ANN. REP. 191, table 8 (1965), shows that there were 951 unfair
labor practice cases closed after Board decision, of which 540 were closed prior to
circuit court decree. Three hundred fifty-nine cases were closed after a decree and
before Supreme Court action. But 52 required Supreme Court action. The vast
majority of cases, 14,160 in 1965, are resolved prior to any decision by the Board,
a statistic indispensable to preserving the Board as a viable administrative agency.
8There were 212 petitions to the courts of appeals in 1965 for review or en-
forcement, 122 being affirmed in full, 47 affirmed with modification, 7 remanded to
the Board and 36 set aside. No cases were partially affirmed and partially remanded
in 1965. Id. at 212, table 19.
49 NLRB v. Acme Industrial Co., 385 U.S. 432, 436 (1967).
50 NLRB v. C & C Plywood Corp., 385 U.S. 421, 430 (1967).
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which will capitalize on his direct contact with the parties, his capacity
for prompt disposal of the issue and his insulation against judicial
second-guessing. That requires that he be accepted as the primary
tribunal for discovery.
There is little doubt that the Court wants to maintain and
strengthen arbitration as a major forum for the resolution of labor
disputes. On its face, the Acme Industrial reasoning would appear to
reaffirm that commitment. But the Court, seeking conceptual accom-
modation, has run afoul of the pragmatics of the discovery situation.
Allocation of an exclusive first-instance jurisdictional responsibility to
the Labor Board, whether through the exercise of its own discretion or
the exigencies of judicial review, would miss the necessities of discovery
by 180 degrees.
Labor Board jurisdiction is indeed needed and vital. But it must
be a superintending rather than a first-instance jurisdiction, and it
ought not extend to interim procedures. The critical reality is that
interim contractually-based procedures like arbitral discovery should
be held to be administrable by the arbitrator exclusive of the Board.
Expedited interim procedures responsive to the NO W-problems arising
in the course of the operation of the grievance procedure are beyond
the capacities of the Board, as it is presently structured. Its extended
time-span stifles intelligent resolution of otherwise remediable prob-
lems. The decisional interaction on interim arbitral discovery orders
should be between arbitrators and courts, under the protective aegis
of Rule 30(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Discovery issues are so important to the parties that arbitrators
certainly can be expected to exercise arbitral discovery powers with
considerable restraint and with prudent concern for whether the
remedies contemplated actually comport with expectations current in
the labor-management community. Their sensitivity in that respect
will be shared in considerable measure with Labor Board members and
their staff, who are also in continuing contact with that community.
But it is quite improbable, except in isolated instances, that judges
ever would have had occasion to develop that kind of awareness. To
repeat, "[i]n the context of the plant or industry the grievance may
assume proportions of which judges are ignorant." '
The Court in Acme Industrial readily could have articulated its
own sense of the proper division of function and responsibility between
the Labor Board and arbitration. Implicit in the disposition of Acme
Industrial is the availability of a future assessment by the Court of
the Board's efforts to establish an effective interaction between it and
51 uSW v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 567 (1960).
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arbitration, one which will leave to arbitrators the primary responsi-
bility for the administration of the collective agreement. In other
words, the Court has elected in Acme Industrial, as a matter of judicial
administration, to permit the Labor Board initially to exercise the
administrative rule- or decision-making techniques it has evolved over
the years in the area of its expertise. But that initial freedom is
subject, nonetheless, to the prospect of critical scrutiny by the Court
to assure that the resultant interaction fashioned by the Board shall
be in the best interests of national labor policy.
III
Arbitral discovery should be examined in a real-life context. In
order to approximate that setting as nearly as possible, we shall briefly
sketch the characteristics of the bargaining environment in which
Apocrypha, Inc. and Local 711 function. Then we shall examine some
of the NOW-problems of discovery presently found in bargaining
relationships.
A. Some Preliminary Observations on the NOW-Problems
Several observations should be made at the outset. It must be
emphasized that in most cases employers and unions would have no
trouble in these situations, because they would freely disclose the
requested information. Perhaps the information might not be supplied
in quite the form desired, but it would be disclosed nonetheless, to the
satisfaction of the party seeking disclosure. Indeed, there are many
bargainers who, as a matter of policy, volunteer information even before
a request, once its relevance has become apparent.
52
Seven characteristics are common to most discovery situations.
First, in grievance situations, the information sought is generally
necessary for an intelligent and prudent determination of whether to
press a dispute to arbitration at all. If the dispute is to be submitted to
an arbitrator, the information will be needed for a realistic determina-
tion of the tactical positions to take in the course of the arbitration.
Second, the party seeking discovery may lose important substantive
52 Sometimes parties choose not to seek disclosure of relevant bargaining in-
formation. For example, there are some unions with no desire whatsoever to inhibit
their bargainers by embarrassing them with the facts of the particular enterprise. As
a bargaining gambit, they want no access to operational information other than that
which is put on the bargaining table by the employer. Similarly, a number of em-
ployers prefer to remain ignorant of the internal affairs of the unions representing their
employees. The Labor Act reinforces the latter forbearance, by barring employer
"interference" in the internal affairs of unions. NLRA § 8(a) (1), 29 U.S.C. § 158
(a) (1) (1964). It is important to recognize, however, that many employers would
have it no other way, both as a matter of self-interest in effective bargaining and
as a reflection of basic managerial philosophy, quite aside: from the statutory policy.
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rights if discovery is not granted and swiftly implemented. Third, the
manner of the ultimate resolution of each dispute is of prime concern
to both parties. Fourth, the disclosure necessarily will reveal details
of the standard operating procedures of the disclosing party, including,
on occasion, details of its relations with other persons and institutions.
Fifth, the material disclosed may tend to produce insights and data
valuable for future use in negotiations. Sixth, the decision whether to
grant discovery at all and, if so, the particular method and extent of
the discovery to be ordered involve delicate problems which are central
to the collective bargaining relationship. The requisite cast of judgment
in each discovery situation is one in which the decision-maker conceives
himself to be responsive to the particular circumstances of the parties
and not to some set of general concepts or rules extrinsic to their
relationship. Clearly this involves an informed prudence in the
decision-maker administering arbitral discovery. Seventh, an element
common to these situations will be a sense of outrage at the prospect
of "intrusion" into the internal affairs of the union or into manage-
ment's discretion to operate the business.
These observations about discovery situations tend to support the
Supreme Court's observation in Acme Industrial that there is a need
for a specialized "institutional competency" in administering a remedy
so enmeshed in the delicate process of collective bargaining. The
necessary "institutional competency" can be achieved in arbitration,
since the labor-management community can rely on the arbitrator's
experience and prudence to serve as an effective governor of discretion.
An arbitrator's abuse of discretion or lack of prudence will result in
loss of acceptability as an arbitrator-he thereafter rarely will be called
upon by the parties.
B. The Enterprise-Apocrypha, Inc. and Local 711
Apocrypha, Inc., manufactures a diverse line of products for com-
mercial and government use at several plants. At its Alpha plant, one
hundred men are employed as production and maintenance workers in
Building A, and one hundred employees, characterized as "technicians,"
are engaged in Building B in what the company regards as develop-
mental work. Ten years ago the National Labor Relations Board
certified Local 711 to represent the production and maintenance em-
ployees in Building A, but denied certification for the technicians in
Building B. The company's Omega plant, located elsewhere in the
city, is not organized by Local 711.
Apocrypha and Local 711 have been parties to a collective bargain-
ing agreement since the certification. The grievance procedure outlines
1968]
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successive steps, geared to the authority structure of the company,
through which a dispute is to be processed.
Step 1 of the grievance procedure provides for discussion between
the aggrieved employee and his foreman in the presence of the union
steward within five days of the incident. No written statement is re-
quired. If no settlement results within 48 hours, the dispute must
move into Step 2 or be dismissed.
To qualify for consideration at Step 2, the grievance must be set
out in a written statement, signed by both the aggrieved employee and
the steward and submitted to the supervisor within seven days of the
incident The statement must contain all pertinent information, includ-
ing the specific contractual provisions relied upon and the relief sought.
Within three days the supervisor "shall" meet with the aggrieved
employee and his steward to discuss the matter. The supervisor must
render a written decision within forty-eight hours after this meeting.
The aggrieved employee may appeal in writing to the Plant
Superintendent within forty-eight hours under Step 3. The Plant
Superintendent must render a written decision within three days. If
the parties remain at impasse, Local 711 may then demand arbitration.
Step 4 provides for the selection of an impartial arbitrator.
Among the various other provisions in the collective agreement
is a typical recognition clause, Local 711 being recognized as the sole
and exclusive representative for all production and maintenance em-
ployees employed at the Alpha plant; a union shop provision; a manage-
ment prerogatives clause; and a no-strike and no-lockout provision.
C. Some NOW-Problems of Apocrypha and Local 711 -3
Discovery Situation #1
On August 31, 1961, an Apocrypha employee asked the com-
pany's industrial relations manager if Local 711 could properly fine him
and have him fired for producing parts in excess of a quota adopted
by a majority of the union's membership. He just had been informed
that he had been tried and found guilty of "violating trade rule 36-
by producing an excessive amount of parts per day," and that his dues
payments were to be applied to a fine of $30. Consequently, he became
in arrears on his dues and liable to be fired for failure to pay them.
He told the industrial relations manager that a number of employees
similarly had been disciplined for violating trade rule 36, emphasizing
5 3 As we examine the discovery situations in the following pages, it will be
obvious that this study is not an effort to detail all possible variations in which the
NOW-problems of discovery can occur in collective bargaining. But enough varia-
tion has been sought to show that discovery can have crucial practical consequences
in those recurrent NOW-problems.
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that neither he nor the other men wanted to make any trouble for the
union, lest they be disciplined for "conduct unbecoming a union
member" as well. The industrial relations manager immediately tele-
phoned the union business representative and said there were rumors
that the union was fining employees for overproduction. He said that
Apocrypha regarded such a practice as a slowdown violative of the
no-strike clause of the collective agreement. The union's representative
answered that the company was intruding in the union's internal
affairs and refused to discuss the matter further.
What options does Apocrypha have in these circumstances? The
affected employees are not likely to complain to the NLRB about the
union. The company can of course file charges with the Labor Board
under either section 8(b) (1) (A),"M 8(b) (3) r or perhaps both.
Were it to do so and were the matter to spin out at the pace that it did
in Associated Home Builders of Greater East Bay, Inc. v. NLRB,16
(the case from which these facts were drawn), the time span would
inexorably stretch out for Apocrypha as it did for the Associated
Home Builders:
August 31, 1961
Union notified employee of fine for pace setting.
November 22, 1961
Union notified employee that dues would be applied to
fine and that failure to pay arrearage might result in loss
of job.
January 17, 1962
Section 8(b) (1) (A) charges filed by company.
April 5, 1962
General Counsel issued complaint.
June 11, 13, 1962
Trial Examiner heard the case.
July 25, 1962
Trial Examiner issued Intermediate Report finding
union violated section 8(b) (1) (A).
February 14, 1964
NLRB issued decision modifying Trial Examiner's
Report but adopting his conclusion that section
8(b)(1) (A) was violated.
October 29, 1965
Court of appeals denied enforcement of Board's order.
Time elapsed between chargeable act and court order: 50 months.
64 LMRA § 8(b) (1) (A), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1) (A) (1964).
55 LMRA § 8(b) (3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (3) (1964).
56 352 F.2d 745 (9th Cir. 1965).
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This was obviously a dispute of immediate consequence. It is not
difficult to imagine the tense and bitter feelings that the dispute may
have aroused among all involved. For the sake of an effective bargain-
ing relationship, it should have been resolved as rapidly as possible.
Instead, it ground on for over four years and even then was unre-
solved on remand to the Board. After four years, the dispute had
become disembodied, a contest about statutory phrases, far removed
from the immediacy of outrage and the catharsis of final decision, prag-
matically unrelated to the human situation which gave rise to it. Such
maltreatment of a labor dispute takes a particular human stress,
magnifies it through litigation, detaches it from the original and still
unresolved grievance, and makes it a separate and distinct nettle.
Surely Apocrypha would prefer to avoid the kind of enervating
litigation described here. The typical collective agreement permits
either party to submit a dispute to arbitration,17 and since we have
hypothesized that Apocrypha and Local 711 have a typical agreement,
Apocrypha probably can have the dispute so submitted, thus obtaining
an early decision as to whether the union has violated the no-strike
clause. In the Associated Home Builders case the complaint of the
General Counsel indicated that there were a number of facts that
remained unknown, even though the ensuing procedure before the
Board and court resulted in a certain amount of disclosure. But
consider the cost! After four years the disputants learned that all
along they had been talking about the wrong section of the statute.
57A recent Bureau of Labor Statistics study of collective agreements containing
arbitration provisions (1,609 covering 7,172,100 workers) disclosed that 90 per cent
of the agreements permitted either party to invoke arbitration. BUREAU OF LABOR
STATISTICS, U.S. DFP'T OF LABOR, MAJOR CoLLEcTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS-
ARBITRATION PROCiURES, BULL. No. 1425-6 (1966).
The current Bureau of National Affairs sample analysis of 400 agreements re-
ports that
Ninety-six percent of contracts provide for arbitration of grievances not
settled by the parties themselves. An insignificant proportion of these
agreements-less than 4 percent-specify that a dispute may be submitted to
arbitration only by mutual agreement. Under 11 percent, the union alone is
entitled to sich arbitration. The rest state that arbitration follows auto-
matically upon a deadlock or may be invoked by either party.
2 BNA, COLLECTiVE BARGAINING NEGOTIATIONS AND CONTRACTS § 51:6 (emphasis
added). These more recent studies appear to outdate an apparently contrary con-
clusion in a 1964 BLS study reporting management complaints includible only "in a
few agreements; that is, they were admissible into the formal grievance setup."
BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, MAJOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
AGREEMENTS-GRIEVANCE PROCEDURES, BULL. No. 1425-1, at 5 (1964).
The 1966 BLS figures show that fewer than three per cent of the agreements
studied allowed only the aggrieved party to request arbitration and less than five per
cent limited initiation to the union. Furthermore, nine of the ten sample arbitration
clauses affecting small employers enabled either the employer or the union to request
arbitration. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DE'T OF LABOR, BULL No. 1425-6,
supra at 149.
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Discovery Situation #2
Ten years ago, the NLRB refused to certify the technicians in
Building B as production employees within the bargaining unit. Local
71 1's business agent was told by a former union member, now working
in Building B, that production work was being performed there by
the technicians. Upon inquiry, the personnel manager told the agent
that no production work was being performed in Building B, and denied
permission to inspect Building B to be assured that no production
work was being done there.
In denying permission to inspect, Apocrypha relied on the manage-
ment prerogative clause, reserving to it the power to manage the plant
and direct the employees: the company desired to protect its con-
fidential research and development work by preventing the union from
inspecting Building B. Local 711 relied on the recognition clause
which gives it the right to represent all production and maintenance
employees. Any employees doing production work at the Alpha plant
must be included in the bargaining unit.
The viewpoint of each party is understandable and the NOW-
problem is evident. If Apocrypha has been violating the recognition
clause, only early inspection can prevent a rearrangement of the work
in Building B to comply temporarily with the clause. On the other
hand, the company has a legitimate interest in protecting the con-
fidentiality of its research work. But where shall the problem of
inspection be resolved, before the Board or in arbitration? As the
aggrieved party, the union has the initiative in selecting the forum.
In a similar case, NLRB v. Otis Elevator Co.,' where the em-
ployer refused the union's time-study expert access to the plant, the
union elected the administrative route. The timetable developed as
follows:
September 25, 1950
Union filed grievance complaining of company mal-
administration of incentive wage system.
February 8, 1951
After grievance discussions and company data did not
resolve union's grievance, company refused union time-
study expert permission to enter plant to make an inde-
pendent determination.
January 22, 1952
Union having filed section 8(a) (5) charge, General
Counsel issued complaint.
M208 F.2d 176 (2d Cir. 1953), enforcing as modified, 102 N.L.R.B. 770 (1953).
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March 4, 25, 1952
Trial Examiner conducted hearing.
October 14, 1952
Trial Examiner issued Intermediate Report finding no
violation in refusing entry, because union had available
a contractually "effective means" to obtain data through
arbitration, but recommended that the employer allow
union to copy time-study data of company.
January 24, 1953
Labor Board rejected Trial Examiner's reasoning on
entry issue, and held that it was a violation of section
8(a) (5) to refuse entry as well as to refuse opportunity
to copy.
November 10, 1953
Court of appeals modified Board's order to require data
copying, but denied plant access as contractually un-
warranted "invasion of [company] property by the union
to assemble data." "
Elapsed time from chargeable act to court order refusing enforce-
ment of Labor Board order: 34 months.
In a comparable case, Librascope, Inc.,6  the aggrieved union
chose arbitration. One hundred of five hundred bargaining unit em-
ployees were on layoff when the union sought access to determine if
work which properly should have been done by the workers on layoff
was being done by non-union employees. This clearly was a NOW-
problem of some urgency to the union. The word was out among its
laid-off unit employees that their work was being done by non-unit
employees in violation of the collective agreement. A union that could
not resolve such a pressing and vital issue would face a serious loss
of confidence among its constituents in the plant. In this instance, the
union chose arbitration to resolve this crucial discovery question and
it received a relatively rapid decision. Librascope represents a typical
time-span in arbitration:
59 Judge Charles E. Clark rejected the reasoning of the majority. He noted
that the company, in effect, had conceded that an independent study by the union
might be needed when it sought to defer a ruling on it in any subsequent arbitration.
"But if this is so," he reasoned, "if the Union may go behind a standard to examine
its foundation, . . . no good reason is perceived for its denial at an early and effec-
tive stage in the procedure." Id. at 180. He then added a much-quoted observation:
If the Union is to be allowed to acquire some information, it should not be
stopped short of the most useful data it can develop; nor should it be forced
to grope somewhat blindly through the very stages of grievance procedure,
where adequate information is most likely to lead the parties to amicable
agreement, to await an arbitrator-conducted study to the same end. ...
All the Board has given the Union is the right independently to examine
and check the data underlying the standard so that it may intelligently
handle its grievances and police its contract.
Id.
60 30 Lab. Arb. 358 (1958), (E. Jones, Arbitrator).
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November 27, 1957
Company refused to grant union representative access.
December 3, 1957
Union filed grievance charging contractual violation in
refusal to allow access.
April 3, 1958
Arbitrator issued award after hearing the briefs, holding
that company violated agreement by denying entry.
Total consumption of time from chargeable act to final arbitral
award: 4 months."
Unlike the short time-span exemplified by Librascope, the extended
time-span of a Labor Board proceeding can have a punishing effect on
the prestige of the party seeking to rectify a bargaining affront.
Prestige in this context has an economic value in its influence on the
other party's willingness to make concessions. Prestige also affects the
attitudes of employees toward the quality of their work or the attitudes
of employers toward the needs which their employees deem important.
On the other hand, while risking a loss of prestige and its economic
consequences, the party charging a statutory violation enlists the in-
vestigative resources and litigation skill of the General Counsel's office
and, if judicial enforcement is necessary, acquires the imprimatur of
a declaration by a United States court of appeals that the respondent
has engaged in "illegal" activities. There may be a tendency to
underrate the impact which that kind of federal presence has on
workers in their attitudes toward their jobs, their union and the
enterprise. But that presence is no substitute for the remedy of dis-
covery when discovery, rather than belated disclosure with a federal
imprimatur, is what is needed.'
61 Librascope also indicates some of the tactical problems in discovery situations.
Although the union had elected to try the issue on the merits prior to discovery, it
could have continued the matter pending its investigation of the premises. This
would have enabled it to avoid any time limitations in the collective agreement by
having launched the arbitration, thus preserving its option to go forward or drop
the matter, depending on the results of its discovery-aided investigation.
62 Of course, a major consideration in assessing this option is that the charging
party need not pay a thin dime for all that federal talent and time. So long as he is
willing to refrain from being an intervenor, he need spend no money on the proceed-
ing. This must also be a major factor in the Labor Board's determination in the
context of a specific case whether to direct the charging party to exhaust its con-
tractual remedy. The fact that a majority of unfair labor practice charges involve
enterprises characterizable as "small businesses" should preclude the Board from
establishing an inflexible contract exhaustion rule one way or the other in refusal-to-
disclose cases. Two-thirds of the 1965 unfair labor practice situations received by
the Board occurred in bargaining units with less than 100 employees. Half had less
than 50 employees, more than a third had less than 30 and a fifth had less than 10.
30 NLRB ANN. REIP. 210, table 18 (1965). Arbitration may be an exorbitant choice,
affording no effective remedy to the charging party, although in some situations
the financial burden may be reasonable for the parties involved. Also, electing the
more cumbersome, albeit "free," procedures of the Labor Board, rather than the
1968]
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Discovery Situation #3
Local 711 requested Apocrypha to discharge an employee who
allegedly had not paid or tendered his dues within the time required
by the agreement. The company suspected that the union frequently
overlooked similar delinquencies, and that for several years some em-
ployees had not been required to pay any dues. The union maintained
that the matter was its business, not the company's. The company
asked to see Local 711's membership records to verify suspicion. The
union angrily refused.
Apocrypha is in a dilemma. When a collective agreement makes
union membership a condition of employment, the Board has held that
the employer commits an unfair labor practice in refusing to discharge
a dues-delinquent employee.' However, an employer who discharges
an employee at union request can be held liable if the ground advanced
by the union proves to be invalid. A union's ground is invalid if, for
example, the requested action is really a discriminatory retaliation
against one of its members."
What should the company do? If it complies with the demand, it
incurs the risk of a wrongful discharge for which it will have to respond
in back pay. If the company refuses to comply with the demand, its
situation is somewhat improved. It can either file a grievance itself
or attempt to secure union agreement to submit the dispute to arbitra-
tion. If neither of these possibilities is available, and if the employer
can demonstrate contractual arbitrability and the desirability of arbitral
discovery, it can defend before the Board and request deferral to
arbitration. In arbitration the employer can seek discovery in con-
nection with its defense to the grievance. It is quite apparent, in any
expedited time-span of arbitration, actually may prove a more costly choice by the
time the disclosure is obtained. The union in the Acme Industrial case might have
done well to consider the "costs" of this course of action, particularly if any employees
were on layoff while that machinery was being moved out of the plant. A Board
proceeding also amounts to an exorbitant cost to the employer who wants to recoup
actual damages suffered because of a no-strike pledge since such a remedy is unavail-
able from the Board. Actually, however, employers and unions quite often feel com-
pelled to retain counsel and become intervenors, thereby undertaking a substantial
cost in connection with the Board proceeding. Thus the thin-dime approach is often
a fallacy.
63E.g., Montgomery Ward & Co., 1967 CCH NLRB Dec. 120,992 (1966). Of
course, a union does not violate the act when it strikes in reaction to an employer's
unfair labor practice in order to compel it to stop the practice. Mastro Plastics
Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270 (1956).
However, the Labor Board has since construed Mastro Plastics to protect the
striking employees only when they strike against "flagrant" or "serious" unfair labor
practices, those which may be characterized as "destructive of the foundation on
which collective bargaining must rest." Arlan's Dept. Store, Inc., 133 N.L.R.B. 802,
808 (1961) (quoting Mastro Plastics Corp., 350 U.S. at 281). But see Cox, The
Legal Nature of Collective Bargaining Agreements, 57 MIcH. L. REv. 1, 16-19 (1958).
64 E.g., Bricklayers Local 11, 1967 CCH NLRB Dec. 1121,011.
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event, that the immediate availability of discovery would obviate the
serious temporal and economic difficulties presented by this problem. 5
In the actual case from which these facts were drawn,6 the union
grieved the company's refusal to discharge. At the arbitration hearing,
company witnesses indicated their belief that an inconsistent dues
policy existed. The arbitrator asked the union if its books would
disclose actual payments made. The answer was yes. At the arbi-
65 There are other foreseeable instances where an employer will want to assess
the alternative courses of action open to him. One worth noting here is a wildcat
strike over the opposition of union leadership.
The employer generally has four options in such a situation. One is practical,
three are legal. The utility of each depends on the circumstances. The first, which
will be the most useful in most situations, is to shrug off the whole thing in order
to build up the prestige of the union's officers; in that way, disgruntled employees
will be more inclined to be led by the officers, rather than to strike whenever they are
upset. Several questions are relevant in considering this course of action. What dam-
ages actually were incurred? Has this kind of wildcat action occurred before? What
prospect is there, given the individuals and plant involved, that the union officials can
actually be expected to lead? The answers to these questions will also be relevant
to the employer's election among its other options: to file a § 8(b) (3) charge with
the Labor Board; to bring an action for damages under § 301 ; to bring the matter
to arbitration.
The extended time required to file and litigate a § 8(b) (3) charge may make
that option undesirable. Boeing Co. v. UAW, 370 F.2d 969 (3d Cir. 1967), illus-
trates the third option open to employers in anticipation of a no-strike case. Cer-
tain union members admittedly engaged in a work stoppage constituting a strike,
and Boeing brought an action for damages under § 301. In its answer, UAW
admitted the strike action of the members, but denied liability for their activities.
UAW also moved for a stay of the action pending arbitration of the no-strike clause
violation issue. The federal district court refused to grant a stay, and the circuit
court affirmed on appeal. The Third Circuit analyzed the arbitration provisions
under the Warrior & Gulf standard: that an order to arbitrate should be granted
"unless it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not
susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute." Id. at 970 (quoting
USW v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582-83 (1960)). The court found
that the Boeing-UAW grievance procedure was "employee oriented. . . . The entire
procedural structure is designed to resolve only the employees' grievances against the
company." 370 F.2d at 971. Therefore the case was unlike Drake Bakeries v. Local
50, Amer. Bakery & Confectionery Workers, 370 U.S. 254 (1962), in which the
Supreme Court held an employer's damages claim to be arbitrable rather than
actionable, because there was a comprehensive grievance procedure calling for the
arbitration of "all complaints, disputes or grievances" about "any act or conduct or
relation between the parties hereto, directly or indirectly." Id. at 257 (quoting
article V of the arbitration agreement). The Boeing-UAW agreement was more
like the employee-structured grievance procedure in Atkinson v. Sinclair Ref. Co.
(Atkinson II), 370 U.S. 238 (1962) in which the Supreme Court had held that the
arbitration clause was "not susceptible to a construction" that the plaintiff was bound
to arbitrate the issues involved in its action for damages. Id. at 241. Therefore, in
the Boeing case, the Third Circuit concluded that because there was no contractual
obligation to the contrary, "a reluctant party is free to pursue any available legal
remedy to redress its grievances." 370 F.2d at 970.
Counselled by Boeing, an employer who wished to have quick access to arbitra-
tion in a no-strike situation would want to have the broader phraseology of the Drake
Bakeries arbitration provision. The employer, who would prefer to be in a state
court and would prefer damages from the court rather than an arbitrator, will want
the Boeing arbitration terminology in his collective agreement. The availability of
discovery to the employer is apt to be linked to his standing to initiate arbitration.
Of course, he can trigger an arbitration, if he wishes, by disciplining employees and
request discovery from an arbitrator in connection with the union's subsequent
grievance.
66 Unpublished opinion from the author's files.
19681
596 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
trator's suggestion, the books were readily and willingly obtained at
the lunch break for company inspection. A stipulation was agreed to
within half an hour. One more drop of jaundice in the blood of either
of these parties well could have pushed the dispute into Labor Board
procedures averaging sixteen months to initial decision and twenty-
eight months to enforcement order. Instead, an arbitral award order-
ing the employer to dismiss the delinquent employee " was issued
within six months.
Discovery Situation #4
Under the agreement between Apocrypha and Local 711 the
employer must accumulate and pay over to the union for credit to the
Health and Welfare Fund three per cent of the gross weekly payroll.
The payment must be accompanied by an itemized statement giving
the name of each worker and the amount credited to him. Local 711
found evidence of seven cases in which there were discrepancies of over
fifty per cent between the entries on the employer's state disability
reports and the amounts reported for the purpose of the three per cent
fund. Upon inquiry, Apocrypha acknowledged the discrepancies and
paid over the amount due. The union then sought to examine the
employer's books and records to determine the cause of the discrepancies
and to see if others existed. Apocrypha refused.
What are Local 711's options? It could file a section 8(a) (5)
charge with the Labor Board. But that procedure is an after-the-fact
remedy at best, and certainly does not amount to "discovery." In
these circumstances an unfair labor practice charge is far too cumber-
some; a party can fend off disclosure long enough to "clean up"
its books.
In the actual case from which these facts were drawn, J. B. Lion
Corp.,' the union elected to arbitrate. However, unlike the Apocrypha
situation, they also had negotiated a specific provision for union access
to the employer's books and records "having any bearing on the ques-
tion involved." 6 The union first became aware of the discrepancies
in June of 1966. By September 27, 1966, it had an arbitrator's award
compelling disclosure, which, under federal law, was final and binding.
If the employer had resisted, the union probably could have obtained
67 The status of the delinquent employee presents a potentially serious problem.
In this case he was a close relative of the employer and his interests were well pro-
tected. If the interest of the employee is not so protected, ought he then be enabled
to join as a "party" to assure adequate attention to his rights? See the discussion in
Maier Brewing Co., 45 Lab. Arb. 1115, 1122-23 (1965) (E. Jones, Arbitrator).
68 66-3 ARB ff 8793 (1966) (Summers, Arbitrator).
69 Id. at 5734 (quoting from article 8 of the collective agreement).
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enforcement within a few weeks in either a federal district court or
a state court.
In contrast to the brevity and ease of implementation of arbitral
discovery illustrated by J. B. Lion, the Boston Herald-Traveler cases "
illustrate the potential difficulties inherent in seeking a solution to a
similar problem in the NLRB-court of appeals process. The Boston
newspaper enmeshed a local of the International Typographical Union
in a frustrating and readily utilizable pattern of avoiding disclosure.
The employer refused, on January 2, 1952, to disclose information
detailing the composition of its payroll. Two years and another con-
tract negotiation later, the First Circuit Court of Appeals enforced the
Board's order that the Herald-Traveler "[u]pon request, furnish to
the Union wage data concerning work classifications and salaries of
all employees in said unit." "' Three weeks before the decision, the
employer disclosed data, but continued to withhold information linking
the names of employees to specific wage rates. In support of its
refusal, the employer argued that the intervening negotiation and
contract execution demonstrated that the union did not really need
the information.
Once again the union filed a section 8(a) (5) charge. A year and
a half and still another contract negotiation later, the court of appeals,
observing that in "dozens of cases" the Labor Board had ordered dis-
closure of precisely this kind of information, enforced the Board's
more specific order that the employer, "[u]pon request furnish to the
Union the name of each employee in the bargaining unit together with
the earnings of each named employee." 72
Total time in getting this NOW-problem of discovery to the brink
of resolution was three and a half years, and two contract negotiations
were conducted without the benefit of the wrongfully withheld in-
formation. Obviously, this is compelled disclosure which neither can
be called "discovery" nor regarded as "relief." Time lags such as
this have prompted the Board to note that sections 8(a) (5) and
8(b) (3) are "increasingly losing significance" '3 due to the time lag
between the failure to bargain and the ultimate "relief." "
710Boston Herald-Traveler Corp., 102 N.L.R.B. 627 (1953), order enforced, 210
F.2d 134 (1st Cir. 1954) ; Boston Herald-Traveler Corp., 110 N.L.R.B. 2097 (1954),
order enforced, 223 F.2d 58 (1st Cir. 1955).
71210 F.2d at 136 (quoting 102 N.L.R.B. at 629).
72 110 N.L.R.B. at 2100. Perhaps it is an unduly cynical note of caution to
observe that this kind of delay could come about as a joint charade of an employer
and a preferred union to fend off prospective decertification efforts by another union.
However, the record in Boston Herald-Traveler does not suggest that kind of statu-
torily wrongful conduct (not that it would be apt to)-there is no suggestion in it
of the interest of any competing union.
73 McCulloch Corp., 132 N.L.R.B. 201, 214 n.46 (1961).
74 But "relief" is indeed a euphemism for what happens in these discovery situa-
tions. The Cox panel in 1960 found that contested unfair labor practice cases aver-
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Discovery Situation #5
Local 711's agent came to the plant at the request of the personnel
manager and was given written notice of the discharge of fifty-five
named employees. There were one hundred men in the bargaining
unit. The cause was stated to be "dishonesty." The personnel manager
refused to disclose any other information or even to discuss the matter.
Upon written demand by Local 711 for details, Apocrypha replied in
a letter that "The Company has and will present such evidence as is
needed to sustain its action in all 55 cases should Local 711 elect to
pursue the matter in arbitration."
Local 711 is in a very tough spot. The employer is not apt to
draw fifty-five misfires in this sequence of discharges. Nor do the
odds favor his complete success. It is more likely that some of the
employees are completely innocent and their dismissal unwarranted,
while other employees probably are guilty of acts making their dis-
charges sustainable for "just cause." " If Apocrypha can successfully
force Local 711 to pursue its claims in arbitration, without prior dis-
covery, the union is severely disadvantaged. They will be put to the
expense and trouble of litigating the claims of those employees whose
discharges were proper. Further, the grievances of those employees
who are innocent of wrongdoing might well be prejudiced if they are
intermingled and tried together with those that are clearly fatuous.7"
aged almost 29 months from filing of the charges to issuance of an effective decree.
This finding led the Panel to make the observation quoted at the outset of this study:
"A remedy granted more than 2 years after the event will bear little relation to the
human situation which gave rise to the need for government intervention." Cox
PANEL, supra note ft', at 2.
In examining the Labor Board's fiscal 1958 experience, the Cox Panel found
average elapsed time of 230 days from filing to issuance of the trial examiner's
report; 235 more days to get the Board's decision; and an additional 378 days to
obtain a court decree enforcing or setting aside the Board's order. Of this calendar
array the Panel concluded, "These shocking delays seriously affect the usefulness
of the National Labor Relations Act." Its conclusion was that "No change in the
substantive provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act is more important than speeding
up the processes of decision in unfair labor practice cases." Cox PANEL, Mipra note
-, at 10-11. The Board has since tightened up its timetables in several areas, but the
average timetable in discovery situations has remained substantially unchanged.
7- As an instance of difficult competing values and their relationship to problems
of credibility, which can arise in situations in which "just cause" must be determined,
see Yellow Cab Company, 44 Lab. Arb. 175, 445 (1965) (E. Jones, Arbitrator) (dis-
charge for disloyalty of meter mechanic whose disclosure to competitor for city-wide
franchise resulted in ublic knowledge that employer had unlawfully rigged its cab
meters).
76 Normally, unmeritorious claims tend to be filtered out in the pre-arbitral steps
of the grievance procedure. The operation of a large plant can generate nearly one
thousand grievances a year, with perhaps a dozen or less going on to arbitration.
The Supreme Court in Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967), expressed concern over
the possibility that excessive tenacity by either union or management might so "over-
burden the arbitration process as to prevent it from functioning successfully." Id. at
192. The Court cited the testimony of a Packinghouse Workers officer in Vaca that
only one of 967 grievances filed in all of Swift's plants during 1961-1963 was taken
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Unmerited grievances by employees who profess outrage at their
employer's warranted disciplinary action cannot but impair the oppor-
tunity for a fair hearing for those who should not be discharged but
are caught up in a hotchpot hearing. Furthermore, the plight of any
wrongfully discharged employee can be desperate. "Dishonesty"
charges preclude interim employment and can also constitute the "mis-
conduct" which also bars unemployment compensation. Household
budgets in our credit economy are not usually set up to bear this kind
of stress, nor can a local union normally undertake to finance the
discharged employee. In the background of course is the grim prospect
of criminal prosecution. The union's own survival as bargaining unit
representative was also at issue because it felt that a frontal assault was
being made on its status and that an employer petition for decertification
was imminent since a majority of the bargaining unit had been ter-
minated. It is clear that these difficulties would be substantially
obviated if Local 711 were able to force Apocrypha to disgorge the
relevant information at the earliest stage of the grievance procedure.
It might be noted that such disclosure certainly would not be detri-
mental to the proper interests of Apocrypha. At most, it would deprive
them of an undeserved tactical advantage.
In the unpublished case from which these facts were drawn, the
employer insisted on trying all claims before a single arbitrator. At
the initial hearing, the union requested a continuance and a detailed
discovery order. It wanted the data, as counsel put it, "So we might
know what kind of cases we actually have. We might settle some, all,
or none. We can't know at this stage." The union stated that, after
reassessing the credibility of its own witnesses, it might well withdraw
some of the grievances. The union had already filed a section 8(a) (5)
charge with the Labor Board, but much preferred to get its relief in
arbitration because of the large number of men who would remain
unemployed and unemployable until cleared.
The arbitrator prudently elected to proceed at least through the
complete presentation of the company's first grievance, holding the
union's cross-examination in abeyance until all direct testimony had
been taken. At that time, the union renewed its motion and the
arbitrator granted it. The parties drafted a discovery order. The
hearing was continued pending completion of the discovery procedures.
to arbitration. The amicus brief of the AFL-CIO stated that less than .05 per cent
of all written General Motors grievances were arbitrated and only 5.6 per cent of
United States Steel grievances processed beyond the first step went on to arbitration.
Id. at 192 n.15. Such testimony reflects the importance of the multi-step grievance
procedure to employee, employer and union. An 'employee may air his complaint
with the assurance that it will receive attention and, if meritorious, union support.
The employer and the union are provided with a system in'which problems of varying
difficulty can be resolved within appropriate limits of formality and time.
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The section 8(a) (5) charge was withdrawn. Within several months
the hearing had been reconvened and was heard on the merits, some
of the discharges being sustained, most being set aside. Outside of
arbitration it would have taken years to unsnarl those fifty-five cases.
Discovery Situation #6
Local 711 and the various employers which signed collective
agreements with it 7T established an industry improvement program,
77 Multi-employer bargaining situations are markedly increasing in number. One
variation is that involving one employer and a union bargaining about group interests
affecting many employers. This version, as illustrated in Davidson Brick Co., 31
Lab. Arb. 725 (1958) (E. Jones, Arbitrator), has been employed in the Southern Cali-
fornia brick industry. Another approach, referred to as "multi-employer bargaining,"
involves group bargaining between a union and several employers joined together
in a common front. See, e.g., NLRB v. Johnson, 368 F.2d 549 (9th Cir. 1966).
Bargaining patterns are emerging which suggest that discovery techniques will become
increasingly necessary to the administration of grievance procedures. Two stand out
particularly.
First is the marked increase in multi-employer bargaining in the past ten years.
In 1951, a Bureau of Labor Statistics study found 20 per cent of union members
covered by multi-employer agreements. BumAnu OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T
OF LABOR, LABOR-MANAGEMENT CONTRACr PRoVIsIoNs 1949-50, Bum- No. 1022, at
30-31 (1951). A 1961 study disclosed that the gap had narrowed significantly be-
tween the number of workers covered by multi-employer agreements and those subject
to single-employer contracts. BuREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DFP'T OF LABOR,
MAJOR UNION CONTRACTS IN THE UNrITE STATES, 1961, Bum. No. 1353, at 2-3
(1962). The percentage had increased from 20 to 47 per cent in the decade.
The second development in bargaining patterns is a trend toward contractual com-
mitments extending over longer terms. Thus, in California in the period 1955-1960,
contracts of one year's and two years' duration accounted for slightly over half the
total, while for the period 1960-1965, BLS studies show that contractual terms extend-
ing three years or more have become commonplace, while the one year and two year
agreements have become exceptional. BuREAu OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF
LABOR, CoLLEcTrvE BARGAINING PATTERNS, SAN FRANCISCO, AND Los ANGELES, 1955-
65, REGIONAL REPORT No. 9 (John L. Dana).
When a union deals with an association of employers in relation to a grievance,
it is apt to find itself in a more formalized procedural situation than when it con-
fronts a single employer. A union which is responsive to its membership has different
and more complex problems in achieving flexibility in adopting or changing bargaining
positions than a single employer is apt to have. But a group of employers becomes a
constituent process itself, and two constituent processes at loggerheads present an even
greater complexity. As both parties tend to become extremely sensitive to nuances
in the sequence of events and in each other's actions or omissions by crediting them
with possible tactical significance in the "winning" of the "case," the prospect of
early disclosure diminishes considerably. A litigation-like environment tends to move
the parties away from negotiation and toward tactical manipulation of the grievance
procedure. It quite naturally puts a premium on discovery for whichever "side" is
disadvantaged by the lack of access to information in the control of the other. This
attitude produces an evasiveness which, in turn, leads to a felt need for disclosure.
And the tendency is increased, at least to the extent that the employer association's
administrator lacks sufficient political strength among his constituents to play a
dominant role in mediating settlements between the union and one of his constituent
employers. A strong administrator may not wish to go to arbitration at all, particu-
larly when he confronts a relatively weak union. There is enough variety here to
make generalization precarious without more detailed studies.
The addition of another professional buffer between an employer and his employees,
who are already bargaining through an agent, might not alone provoke discovery
situations. But when this relationship is considered in light of the several years'
term of the typical collective agreement, it becomes apparent that a party disadvantaged
by the unavailability of information will find it increasingly difficult to bear with its
lack of knowledge and hope to gain disclosure at the next round of negotiation. This
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administered by the union. Employers agreed to contribute one cent
per hour per employee toward institutional advertising and promotion
of one of the industry's products. Apocrypha is three times the size
of any of the other contributing employers. Its operations are on a
year-round basis with overtime rarely required. Its smaller com-
petitors operate on a seasonal basis, shutting down completely in the
winter months and operating overtime most of the remaining part of
the year. Apocrypha learned that the other employers were reading
"one cent per hour" to refer only to straight time hours rather than total
hours worked including overtime, thus putting Apocrypha at a sub-
stantial competitive disadvantage. Apocrypha's management, con-
vinced that Local 711 was not enforcing the obligation to contribute
against many of the smaller employers, demanded to see the union's
books and minutes relevant to the union's administration of the
program. The union refused on the ground that Apocrypha has no
right to inspect books in order to learn about the internal affairs of
the union and its bargaining relations with other employers.
In Davidson Brick Co.,7" the case from which these facts were
largely (but not entirely) drawn, an employer simply refused to make
any further contributions to the program when it became suspicious
that its competitors were in default. After discussions, the union
wrote the company stating that the other manufacturers were paying
in compliance with the agreement and demanding that the company
do the same. The matter was processed to arbitration, and the decision
was issued three and one-half months after the impasse was reached.
The award compelled the company to contribute its share to the
program. 9
Did the employer have an alternative to refusing to make its
payments? Initially, the union was sympathetic to the company's
is so whether the withholding is due to a tactical decision, the expense of disclosure,
"principle" or any other motivation. The more remote the next round of negotiations
for a new agreement, the more necessary disclosure may be to the effectiveness of
the present administration of the grievance procedure.
Furthermore, the disputes occurring during the terms of collective bargaining
agreements are becoming more complex, the interests of more people are becoming
enmeshed in them and the subjects are more technical and of greater import to the
continued effectiveness of both employers and unions. If the "need to know" standard
governing accessibility to national security information were to have its counterpart
here, it should be noted that occasions where there may be said to be a "need to know"
in bargaining are increasing in proportion to the complexity and importance of issues
submitted to grievance administration which terminates in arbitraton.
78.31 Lab. Arb. 725 (1958) (E. Jones, Arbitrator).
70 At the same time, the arbitrator suggested that either the union or the company
could obtain a § 301 order from a federal court compelling the affected employer to
participate in an accounting arbitration, which is to say, in arbitral joinder. That
procedure is discussed in Jones, On Nudging and Shoving the National Steel Arbitra-
tion Into a Dubious Procedure, 79 HARv. L. RL. 327 (1965); Jones, A Sequel in
the Evolution of the Trilateral Arbitration of Jurisdictional Labor Disputes-The
Supreme Court's Gift to Embattled Employers, 15 U.C.L.A. L. REv. - (April, 1968).
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plight. Its records, however, disclosed only the sums received, not
the basis of the computation used by each employer. Yet the union
normally would be rather reluctant to launch grievances against various
employers at the request of one of them, without independent evidence
of default.
But in the hypothetical situation, Apocrypha may have a remedy
if it can initiate arbitration under its collective agreement or as a
response to a grievance by the union to compel payment of the money.
It can then compel Local 711 to make some kind of disclosure of union
records, showing, perhaps, the sums collected and the number of
employees involved, without unduly intruding into the union's collective
bargaining with the other employers. The extent of disclosure and
intrusion will have to be determined with care by the arbitrator. The
union well may feel that its own institutional interests, relative to both
its members and the other employers, will be protected by a discovery
procedure compelling it to disclose the requested information. The
employer may also elect to seek a joinder award from the arbitrator,
certifying that the dispute ought to be resolved in a proceeding in
which all affected employers and the union are joined. Such an award
would permit the employer to seek an order of joinder from a court
in a section 301 proceeding.
Discovery Situation #7
Apocrypha removed several machines from one section of one
of the reinforced concrete floors of its Alpha plant, leaving holes in
the floor. Management informed Local 711 that it planned to sub-
contract the repairs, since its own maintenance crew was completely
booked and would have to work extensive daily overtime in order to
repair the holes. Local 711 responded that Apocrypha was "subcon-
tracting the Union to death." It demanded that management submit
detailed schedules showing the jobs that the maintenance crew was
scheduled to do. It also demanded the right to examine and copy the
documents in Apocrypha's files, detailing each instance in the past five
years in which bargaining-unit work had been subcontracted. The
demand included all invoices, correspondence, bids and acceptances of
bids and lists of Apocrypha employees who were on layoff or available
for overtime work during times in which the work was contracted
outside the bargaining unit. Management refused the demand.
Subcontracting has been an important issue in American industry
for many years. It has been observed that in some industries, such as
the steel industry, a "common law" has emerged in arbitral awards.
80 Kaiser Steel Corp., 44 Lab. Arb. 25, 28 (1965) (I. Bernstein, Arbitrator).
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Where the collective agreement is silent on the issue, arbitrators have
tended to consider the agreement as a whole, inferring a limiting intent
from provisions like the recognition and seniority clauses. An "implied
limitations theory" has evolved which requires that neither the comple-
ment of regular employees nor the work recognized as belonging to
the bargaining unit shall be reduced arbitrarily or unreasonably by
subcontracting.
What then of the union's requests for disclosure? On the facts
as given, it is probable that the Labor Board would conclude that
there was a section 8(a) (5) failure to bargain in good faith when
Apocrypha refused to disclose at least the details of its prospectively
scheduled jobs for the cement crew.
On the other hand, the request for access to the company's sub-
contract files would present greater difficulties. The Board might
require such disclosure if there were intimations in the record of bad
faith on the part of the employer in the past. In any event, the odds
are that a court of appeals would feel the five-year access to the files
was unduly intrusive.
The point is that a year and a half or so after such a dispute
becomes a NOW-problem, the Board really cannot respond to it with
very much flexibility. The Board is remote in time and space from
the actualities of the empty holes and the schedule of the cement crew.
It must also reckon with a skeptical court looking over its shoulder,
prepared to modify or vacate its disclosure order. Moreover, it is
ridiculous to frame a solemn Labor Board order directing the employer
to disclose the subcontracting plans a year or two later "on request."
Who really cares? This is no longer a discovery situation. In the
minds of the parties it has by this time taken on its own separate
identity as a litigational cause celebre, utterly removed from good-faith
bargaining, disassociated from any bargaining utility.
How would this problem be worked out in arbitration? Un-
doubtedly, an arbitrator would suggest and, if necessary, would order
disclosure of the cement crew schedule. Before granting the request
to examine the company's files, he would want to hear a good deal
about the necessity for reaching back to other problem situations and
about how the past information would be helpful in resolving a present
and fairly well-defined subcontract problem. He would want to know
what facts prompted the union's inquisitiveness. In other words, he
would try to learn whether the union's interest in the files is legitimate.
He might inquire into the possibility of a stipulation drawn by
Apocrypha and Local 711, after they had gone over the company files
together out of his presence. If more detail than that was sought, or
19681
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a standoff between the parties was apparent, he might suggest that the
company produce a sample for the most recent year. Perhaps a
complete file on only one or two transactions would be sufficient. Local
711's suspicions very well might abate, if the employer were ready to
bring in representative material for discussion.
In this kind of situation, my observation is that the labor arbitral
process typically exhibits a certain functional inclination to what
accurately might be called a skeptical receptivity. It would be unusual
for the arbitrator either to rule out access to the files altogether or to
allow the cement crew hearing to become bogged down in a dispute
over access to five-year-old files. Flexibility in such matters is a prac-
tical necessity in which the Labor Board simply cannot indulge, what-
ever may have been the expectations for its expertise in earlier years."1
But the vocation of the labor arbitrator is rooted in a flexible
pragmatism. His is the task of adapting existing ideas, legal and
practical alike, to the new shapes of old problems that are pressed upon
him through the grievance procedures of collective bargaining agree-
ments. The NOW-problems of these discovery situations demand pre-
cisely the kind of response to which he is accustomed. Quite predictably
the parties will object if he allows discovery to become unduly intrusive
or unreasonably unavailable. That is a tension which, when coupled
with the necessity of decision, results either in arbitral prudence at a
hearing or arbitral solitude for a long time thereafter. Therefore
arbitral discovery would predictably proceed as a tentative venture, a
cautious feeling of relevance and necessity, quite unlikely to result in
either a dogmatic exclusion of inquiry or a headlong plunge into data.
Discovery Situation #8
Several months before the expiration of the existing agreement,
representatives of Local 711 and Apocrypha met to negotiate the new
contract. At the first meeting, company negotiators stated that the
Alpha plant was operating at 75 per cent capacity and the company
needed to improve quality and reduce costs. It therefore required a
free hand in production scheduling and in employee job assignments.
81 Since 1947, the Board has had to respond to the operation of a judicial appellate
process to which its record in each case is submitted for critical scrutiny. Congress
has made it clear, according to the Supreme Court, "that a reviewing court is not
barred from setting aside a Board decision when it cannot conscientiously find that
the evidence supporting that decision is substantial when viewed in the light that
the record in its entirety furnishes, including the body of evidence opposed to the
Board's view." Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951);
see id. at 477-91. The Court observed that Congress expressed a mood of "...
disapproval of the finality accorded to Labor Board findings by some decisions of
this and lower courts, or even of the atmosphere which may have favored those
decisions." Id. at 488. Thus, it concluded, "courts must now assume more responsi-
bility for the reasonableness and fairness of Labor Board decisions . . . influenced
by a feeling that they are not to abdicate the conventional judicial function." Id.
at 490.
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The company proposed that overtime premium pay be eliminated and
that it be relieved of the necessity to fill jobs by seniority. Company
negotiators maintained that concessions were essential to the Alpha
plant's survival. They explained that Apocrypha requires each plant
to sustain its share of the corporate overhead and Alpha had fallen
considerably behind the Omega plant. In response, Local 711
negotiators demanded the profit figures and personnel records for the
Alpha plant and an inventory of all production equipment acquired in
the past three years. Company negotiators responded that, since
.Apocrypha's financial records would not be helpful, they would not
be disclosed.
In the actual case from which these facts were drawn, NLRB v.
Celotex Corp.,' the time span was as follows:
February 12, 1962
Negotiations for new contract were commenced with
company; plight described; gross profit and loss de-
manded by union.
March 8, 1962
Current collective agreement expired.
March 29, 1962
Section 8(a)(5) charges filed, and amended on April
4, 1962.
May 16, 1962
General Counsel's complaint issued.
July 9-14, 1962
Trial Examiner conducts hearing.
July 28, 1962
New two-year contract signed effective to March 8, 1964.
June 13, 1963
Trial Examiner issued Intermediate Report, recom-
mending order "to disclose . . . upon appropriate
request therefor during collective bargaining negotia-
tions, financial records of the Respondent which said
Local is entitled to see," but noting that union may
not be entitled in subsequent negotiations because com-
pany might not demand like concessions in 1964.
Whatever may be "the conventional judicial function," it is certainly not regarded
as pragmatic or flexible by the judiciary. It is, instead, one constricted by preceptions
of, as Cardozo put it, "restrictions not easy to define, but felt, however impalpable
they may be, by every judge and lawyer [to] hedge and circumscribe his action.
They are established by the traditions of the centuries. . . ." B. CARozo, THE
NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 114 (1921). The "conventional judicial function"
is, in Learned Hand's phrase, "a self denying ordinance which forbids change in
what has not already become unacceptable." The result is judges who "are curiously
timid about innovations." Hand, The Contribution of an Independent Judiciary, in
THE SxIrr OF LIBERTY 158 (2d ed. I. Dilliard 1953).
82364 F.2d 552 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 987 (1966).
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February 20, 1964
Board issued order as recommended.
March 8, 1964
Collective agreement two-year term expired.
June 28, 1966
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ordered disclosure.
December 12, 1966
Certiorari denied by Supreme Court.
Total time consumed from chargeable act to court order granting
or refusing enforcement of Labor Board order: 58 months.
Celotex raised the defense that the union was aware of the
marginal condition of the plant because of its knowledge of severe
losses in sales, production, and work force. It argued that thus it
reasonably could not be held to have wrongfully withheld information
actually needed by the union. To that assertion, the trial examiner
responded that "There is no doubt that the Union's negotiators were
aware of the plant's declining position. But this awareness was not
such that those negotiators could bargain intelligently upon the extent
to which they should agree to decreases in the incomes of employees." 8
He then concluded that the union was entitled to the profit and loss
figures, in order that it might "intelligently evaluate" the company's
bargaining demands and "determine the extent to which they should
urge the employees to make concessions." '
Almost five years after the NOW-problem of discovery arose, the
wrongfully withholding employer was ordered to disclose the financial
data originally demanded, but only if it elected to continue its reliance
on its economic plight to insist on rewriting the overtime and job
assignment provisions. It is unlikely that the union regarded that
order as a "remedy."
It may be that this kind of problem is soluble only by resort to
economic combat. If so, the Board ought to say so, instead of
engaging in a remedial charade which can only diminish the acceptance
of its expertise. Is there a viable alternative to the Board's incapacity
in these circumstances? More specifically, when the problem of non-
disclosure in contract negotiations arises, as it typically does during
the term of a collective agreement, should it be regarded as arbitrable
and subject to discovery?
Suppose that Local 711 had immediately filed a grievance in order
to protest the failure of Apocrypha to produce the data which could
support an independent determination of the validity of its economic
83146 N.L.R.B. 48, 54 (1964).
84 Id.
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position. Would an arbitrator be apt to order its disclosure? Would
he be warranted in doing so?
Most discovery situations arising during the term of a collective
agreement relate to information needed in order to administer the col-
lective agreement. The traditional approach is to view the grievance
procedure, including arbitration, as part of collective bargaining-a
continuation, in another form, of the basic process of negotiation.
That view is supported by the fact that 95 to 99 per cent of all
grievances are resolved by collective bargaining prior to arbitration.
When the traditional analysis is applied to the 1 to 5 per cent of
grievances that ultimately are arbitrated, it is apparent that arbitration
is an extension of the basic process of collective bargaining; the ad-
versaries have created a mutually acceptable forum of last resort to
resolve unnegotiable grievances. The arbitrator is selected by the
parties, who instruct him carefully (albeit not very helpfully) not to
"alter, amend or modify" their agreement. Thus the arbitrator func-
tions as a kind of projection of their joint will and the arbitration as
an extension of collective bargaining.
Applying that view to Apocrypha (or to Celotex, for that matter),
is there any good reason why an arbitrator should not grant discovery?
If one of the parties supports a bargaining proposition with reference
to certain data and then refuses to disclose that data, is it not reasonable
to compel him to disclose the data, so that its bargaining significance
may be assessed? That kind of disclosure is indeed required by
statute under the federal lawY Should it be deemed to be required
by contract? During the term of a collective agreement, there is
implicit in the bargaining relationship a contractual duty to disclose
data which is needed to administer the agreement. 6 It is a duty which
is rooted in reasonableness and relevancy. When the focus changes
to the negotiation of a successor agreenent during the course of a
current one, the statutory duty to disclose is not affected in the least.
Is there some reason why the contractual duty should be affected?
In answering that question, it is necessary to remember that an
arbitrator ordering disclosure in this situation is not thereby sanctioning
the proposal for which the data is sought, nor is he writing a new
provision through his award. Although it is sometimes difficult to
avoid, students and practitioners of collective bargaining typically agree
that grievance arbitrators should refrain from creating new contractual
terms, so long as there is no joint authorization to perform that
function.87 It is widely felt that the tough economic choices should be
85 NLRA §§ 8(a) (5), 8(b) (3), 49 U.S.C. §§ 158(a) (5), 158(b) (3) (1964).
86See, e.g., Boston Herald-Traveler Corp. v. NLRB, 223 F.2d 58 (1955).8 7 For an example of the difficulties involved in adhering to that arbitral restraint,
see Hillbro Newspaper Printing Co., 48 Lab. Arb. 1166 (1967) (E. Jones, Arbitrator).
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negotiated out across the bargaining table by those who have to live
with the results rather than be imposed by a neutral upon a reluctant
party at the insistence of its adversary.
Given all these precautions, there is no discernible reason why the
union (or the employer) ought not to be able to get discovery in
arbitration, even though the bargaining subject looks to the future,
rather than to the past. It is still grievance arbitration. The duty is
the NOW-duty to bargain in good faith. There is no problem about
keeping the discovery situation separate from the substantive decisions
of the bargainers relative to the data disclosed. But there is a great
problem of timeliness for the party from whom data is wrongfully
withheld. The moment when discovery is needed soon passes, and
belated disclosure is discovery denied. s
IV
It should be clear at this point that discovery situations occur
often enough to be significant problems in the administration of col-
lective bargaining agreements. Discovery during the term of a collec-
tive agreement should be thought of as an unusual remedy responsive
to acute NO W-problems. It may be requested infrequently, but when
it is needed, it is usually vitally important to the party needing it.
Thus, there are compelling reasons for permitting bargainers to have
access to discovery.
The Supreme Court declared in Acme Industrial that
[t]here can be no question of the general obligation of an
employer to provide information that is needed by the bar-
gaining representative for the proper performance of its duties.
• . . Similarly, the duty to bargain unquestionably extends
beyond the period of contract negotiations and applies to
labor-management relations during the term of an agreement.89
88 The Supreme Court recognized the ephemeral characteristic of discovery in
Acme Industrial. Of the Labor Board's disclosure jurisdiction it observed:
[W]hen it ordered the employer to furnish the requested information to the
union, the Board was not making a binding construction of the labor contract.
It was only acting upon the probability that the desired information was
relevant, and that it would be of use to the union in carrying out its statutory
duties and responsibilities. This discovery-type standard decided nothing
about the merits of the union's contractual claims.
385 U.S. 432, 437 (1967).
The administrative problem is no different from that which characterizes discovery
absent the prospect of a successor agreement. It must be fashioned carefully to
effectuate a precisely focused disclosure, and it must be fair both in design and
application.
A discovery grievance filed after termination of a collective agreement would not
be arbitrable unless the parties had manifested their intent to abide by the terms of
the collective agreement until the successor agreement is executed. If arbitration may
be said to be available in that interim bargaining period in response to grievances
arising under the "expired" agreement, then arbitral discovery would also be available
as a remedy.
89385 U.S. 432, 435-36 (1967).
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The Court then authorized the Labor Board to enforce section 8(a) (5)
rights without awaiting "an arbitrator's determination of the relevancy
of the requested information .... " "
It is important, however, to recognize that the Court did not
purport to tell the Board how to dispose of future disputes presenting
the possibility of arbitral discovery. The Court neither required the
Board "to defer to the primary determination of an arbitrator, . . ." "'
nor precluded it from utilizing arbitral discovery as an initial remedy,
where that procedure would effectuate the purposes of the Act.
This concludes the first phase of this study. Discovery situations
may not be common statistically but when they do occur they are
aggravated bargaining situations-NOW-problems. This suggests the
need to inquire further whether it might be possible and desirable to
design appropriate arbitral procedures to cope with them. Is arbitral
discovery, for example, compatible with the theory and practice of
collective bargaining? Can foreseeable abuses be avoided by structur-
ing an uncomplicated sequence of interaction among the collective
bargainers, their arbitrators and the superintending (but rarely in-
voked) courts? Are the traditional objections to the uses of arbitral
discovery in commercial arbitration appropriately invocable in the
context of labor arbitration? Does the latter have the institutional
competence to administer arbitral discovery? If so, what about the
implications of the various legal doctrines radiating from the Federal
Rules, the Taft-Hartley Act, the United States Arbitration Act and
other sources of relevant national policy? To what extent may the
Federal Rules be helpful in fashioning the remedy of arbitral dis-
covery? These will be the concerns of the second of this series of
three articles. In the third article we shall have a close look at the
Labor Board's refusal-to-disclose cases and summarize our conclusions.
As we shall see in more detail in the third article of this series,
the Board's limited resources and lack of power to enforce its own
orders" cause delays that frustrate effective discovery. An empirical
survey of NLRB disclosure cases revealed that the period from filing
to disposition by the Board averaged approximately 17 months. 3 Of
these cases, 44 per cent reached federal courts of appeals for enforcement
of the Board's order. That added process extended the average period
of time required to compel disclosure to over 29 months. In nine out
of ten of the cases in which court enforcement was required, two
'Ol1d. at 436.
91 Id. at 437.
92 Board orders are enforceable by the federal courts of appeals. NLRA § 10(e),
29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1964).
9 3 Cox PANEL, supra note "it, at 10-11.
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and one-half years had elapsed between the initial demand for discovery
and final disposition. After 30 months, disclosure clearly no longer
can be regarded as "discovery." In contrast, three to four months
is the normal time span from demand for disclosure to a final arbitral
award in the nature of discovery.' The importance of swift resolution
of discovery problems strongly commends the use of arbitration, rather
than Labor Board proceedings.
94 See, e.g., J. B. Lion Corp., 66-3 CCH LAB. ARB. AwARDs 8793 (1966)
(Summers, Arbitrator); Librascope Inc., 30 Lab. Arb. 358 (1958) (E. Jones, Ar-
bitrator).
